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THE CROSSROADS OF A LEGAL FICTION AND THE
REALITY OF FAMILIES
Andrew L. Weinstein*

I. INTRODUCTION
In Adoption of M.A.,1 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court,
held that an unmarried, same-sex couple could file a joint petition for adoption of two
foster children in their care.2 This recent decision is only a fraction of a story that
originated a long time ago when same-sex couples began raising children. This
Comment begins by examining the role of the state courts and the United States
Supreme Court in their exposition of family law relating to adoption by same-sex
couples. The United States Supreme Court has periodically weighed in on family law
and parenting in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment,3 providing powerful
guidance for state courts. In analyzing decisions of several states, the issue of adoption
by same-sex couples is explored in the contemporary contexts of de facto parentage,4
guardianship, visitation, child support, and marriage. Although certain circumstances
raise little doubt as to which individuals constitute the parents of a child, other
situations may not be as clear. This Comment will examine the changing definition of
a “parent” in cases where roles were not traditionally established, and how courts’
interpretations of who can be a parent, and likewise a family, are changing to meet the
needs of families.
Next, this Comment examines the effects of parenting by same-sex couples from
a sociological standpoint. Empirical evidence overwhelmingly supports the proposition that children raised by same-sex couples are no different than children parented
by heterosexual couples. Accordingly, such social science findings of equality should
translate to a presumption of equality in the eyes of the law, thus blinding the process
to the sexual orientation of the parents and advancing an argument for parentage based
on equality. A legal presumption of this nature would not only find support in the
empirical evidence, but would also safely rest upon recent Supreme Court decisions
upholding constitutional rights of gay and lesbian persons under the Fourteenth
Amendment.

* J.D. Candidate, 2009, University of Maine School of Law. M.S.W. Candidate, 2009, University
of Southern Maine. The author would like to thank Professor Nancy Wanderer, his mentor, instructor, and
friend, for her enthusiastic support and guidance. Additionally, the author extends his heartfelt appreciation
to his parents, sister, and Bethany Chase, as their encouragement and support have allowed this endeavor
to embody an incredibly meaningful accomplishment.
1. 2007 ME 123, 930 A.2d 1088.
2. Id. ¶ 31, 930 A.2d at 1098.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
4. A de facto parent has been defined by one court as a non-biological caregiver who “has participated
in the child’s life as a member of the child’s family. The de facto parent resides with the child and, with the
consent and encouragement of the legal parent, performs a share of caretaking functions at least as great
as the legal parent.” Stitham v. Henderson, 2001 ME 52, ¶ 25 n.15, 768 A.2d 598, 605 (Saufley, J.,
concurring) (quoting E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999)).
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By painting the contemporary national backdrop of this realm of family law while
also weaving in Maine’s approach, culminating with the landmark decision in Adoption
of M.A., the complexity of the issue at hand is apparent. However, the reader may be
left with dissatisfaction regarding our imperfect legal system, which pales in
comparison to the frustration experienced by those same-sex couples who are refused
the ability to adopt. Despite the inconsistency among the laws of the states on adoption
by same-sex couples, a ray of hope lies in the national trend that favors allowing such
adoptions. Nevertheless, our nation would be best served by the Supreme Court
relying on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to enunciate a
uniform standard for adoption that mandates blindness to sexual orientation of the
prospective adoptive parents along with consideration of the best interest of the child;
thus effecting equality by treating prospective same-sex adoptive couples in the same
manner as heterosexual couples. There exists both a rational basis and laudable
objective in utilizing the Equal Protection Clause in securing protections for same-sex
couples and their children. This would transform a mere ray of hope into the
constitutionally guaranteed equality enunciated in the Fourteenth Amendment.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF “PARENTS” AND “FAMILY”
A. The Authority of the Courts to Intervene and Adjudicate Family Life
It is unusual that guidance on family law is provided by the United States Supreme
Court due to the jurisdictional nature of the issues. However, when provided, such
instruction is plenary in nature. For example, in 1880, the Court examined the roots
of the equity powers over children:
The general authority of courts of equity over the persons and estates of infants . . .
is not questioned. It may be exerted, upon proper application, for the protection of
both. This jurisdiction in the English courts of chancery is supposed to have
originated in the prerogative of the crown, arising from its general duty as parens
patriae to protect persons who have no other rightful protector. But . . . it was very
naturally exercised by the Court of Chancery as a branch of its original general
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction possessed by the English courts of chancery from this
supposed delegation of the authority of the crown as parens patriae is more
frequently exercised in this country by the courts of the States than by the courts of
the United States. It is the State and not the Federal government, except in the
Territories and the District of Columbia, which stands, with reference to the persons
and property of infants, in the situation of parens patriae. Accordingly provision is
made by law in all the States for the appointment of such guardians, whose duties and
powers are carefully defined.5

Although state courts possess the requisite jurisdiction over families and children,
the privacy of family life is protected from excessive or unwarranted State interference
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which provides, “No state
shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law . . . .”6 In applying the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court stated, “The

5. Ins. Co. v. Bangs, 103 U.S. 435, 438 (1880).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 72-73 (2000) (explaining that
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history and culture of Western civilization reflects a strong tradition of parental
concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the
parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an
enduring American tradition.”7 More recently, the Court reiterated this concept when
it provided, “Choices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of children are
among associational rights this Court has ranked as ‘of basic importance in our
society,’ rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment against the State’s unwarranted
usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.”8
What does the Supreme Court mean when it speaks of “families”? The Court has
provided some piecemeal guidance addressing this question, yet there is no cumulative
definition. Primarily, the Court has looked to a biological relationship between a
parent and child in identifying the existence of a family.9 Over sixty years ago the
Court articulated, “It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child
first reside in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”10
Despite the Court’s emphasis on a biological relationship, in Smith v.
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform (OFFER),11 the Court noted
that “[n]o one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and interdependent
relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care may exist even in the
absence of blood relationship.”12 In support of this point (and quite ironically because
same-sex marriage is only permitted in two states13), the Court looked to jurisprudence

the Due Process Clause “does not permit a State to infringe on the fundamental right of parents to make
child rearing decisions simply because a state judge believes a ‘better’ decision could be made”); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972) (holding that parents have a fundamental right to determine the
religious upbringing of their children without State interference); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters of the Holy
Names of Jesus and Mary, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (“The child is not the mere creature of the state; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare
him for additional obligations.”); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (noting that limitations
exist on the power of the state in its ability to make choices for parents on matters of education and
upbringing).
7. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 232. This approach is aligned with the common law approach of England;
families “formed the first natural society, among themselves . . . .” WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1
COMMENTARIES *47.
8. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376
(1971)).
9. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (establishing “[t]he rights to conceive and to raise
one’s children” as essential rights of parents).
10. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). It is important to note that in Prince, the
“parent” was the aunt of the child, who served in the capacity of legal guardian. Id. at 159.
11. 431 U.S. 816 (1977).
12. Id. at 844.
13. In 2003, Massachusetts became the first State to permit same-sex marriage. Goodridge v. Dept.
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that the prohibition of marriage by same-sex couples
did not comport with the Massachusetts Constitution on the grounds that it denied same-sex couples the
liberty and equal protection afforded to same-sex couples). The court reasoned, “Because marriage is, by
all accounts, the cornerstone of our social structure, as well as the defining relationship in our personal
lives, confining eligibility in the institution, and all of its accompanying benefits and responsibilities, to
opposite-sex couples is basely unfair.” Id. at 973 n.5.
In May 2008, the Supreme Court of California invalidated statutory provisions that limited marriage
to a union between a man and woman; thus, same-sex marriage became legally permissible. In re Marriage
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regarding the deeply rooted importance of the institution of marriage, which itself
entails a lack of a blood relationship:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political
parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for
worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an
association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association
for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.14

Moreover, the OFFER Court explained that the familial relationship originates from
the “emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association, and from
the role it plays in ‘promot[ing] a way of life’ through the instruction of children, as
well as from the fact of blood relationship.”15 Additionally, the Court stated that the
legal status of families is not controlling in the determination of the family’s rights, but

Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (holding that the State’s failure to designate same-sex “unions” as
“marriages” violated the Equal Protection Clause of the California Constitution). The court aptly
summarized its conclusion:
[U]nder this state's Constitution, the constitutionally based right to marry properly must be
understood to encompass the core set of basic substantive legal rights and attributes
traditionally associated with marriage that are so integral to an individual's liberty and
personal autonomy that they may not be eliminated or abrogated by the Legislature or by the
electorate through the statutory initiative process. These core substantive rights include,
most fundamentally, the opportunity of an individual to establish—with the person with
whom the individual has chosen to share his or her life—an officially recognized and
protected family possessing mutual rights and responsibilities and entitled to the same
respect and dignity accorded a union traditionally designated as marriage. As past cases
establish, the substantive right of two adults who share a loving relationship to join together
to establish an officially recognized family of their own—and, if the couple chooses, to raise
children within that family—constitutes a vitally important attribute of the fundamental
interest in liberty and personal autonomy that the California Constitution secures to all
persons for the benefit of both the individual and society.
Id. at 399. At the time of publication, this decision was effectively overturned as a result of the statewide
referendum known as “Proposition 8,” conducted in November 2008. Nevertheless, the Court’s
interpretation is instructive.
In October 2008, the Supreme Court of Connecticut struck down the state’s ban on same-sex
marriage, holding that the prohibition constituted violations of due process and equal protection as afforded
by the state constitution. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008) (noting that
“because the institution of marriage carries with it a status and significance that the newly created
classification of civil unions does not embody, the segregation of heterosexual and homosexual couples into
separate institutions constitutes a cognizable harm”). The court flatly rejected the notion that marriages and
civil unions in the State of Connecticut were separate but equal, stating that the disparate treatment was
“every bit as restrictive as naked exclusion.” Id. at 418 (quoting Evening Sentinel v. Nat’l Org. for Women,
357 A.2d 498, 504 (Conn. 1975)).
Vermont, New Jersey, and New Hampshire have created legal unions that provide similar rights to
same-sex couples with the exception of the actual label of “marriage.” NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, SAME SEX MARRIAGE, CIVIL UNIONS AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP (2008),
http://www.ncsl.org/programs/cyf/samesex.htm. Maine, Hawaii, the District of Columbia, Oregon, and
Washington have created legal unions that provide a subset of the rights of civil marriage. Id. Over half
of the states nationwide have incorporated provisions in their state constitutions that limit marriage to
heterosexual couples. Id.
14. OFFER, 431 U.S. at 843-44 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)).
15. Id. at 844 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 231-33).
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rather, a more comprehensive inquiry that analyzes the interpersonal relationships is
required.16
In 2000, the Court provided further guidance in Troxel v. Granville,17 striking
down a Washington statute on the ground that it unconstitutionally allowed the State
to substitute its judgment in matters of childrearing for that of a fit parent.18 Tommie
Granville and Brad Troxel were the unmarried biological parents of their two
daughters, Isabelle and Natalie.19 After the relationship between Tommie and Brad
ended, Brad resided with his parents where he regularly brought his daughters during
weekend visitation.20 Brad committed suicide in May 1993, and several months later
Tommie Granville sought to limit visitation between Brad’s parents, Jennifer and Gary
Troxel, and her daughters.21 The Washington Superior Court for Skagit County
initially heard the grandparents’ petition for visitation, and broadly interpreted the
applicable statute to permit for visitation over the objections of Tommie Granville.22
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, and the Washington Supreme Court
affirmed.23
In Troxel, the Supreme Court set out to resolve this matter by noting: “In light of
this extensive precedent, it cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions
concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.”24 In reaching its judgment,
the Court relied on the “presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their
children.”25 Accordingly, the Court concluded that if “a parent adequately cares for

16. See id. at 845; see also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (citation omitted) (“Nor has
the [Constitution] refused to recognize those family relationships unlegitimized by a marriage ceremony.”).
Some believe that the family should have the sole ability to determine its rights without state interference,
supported by the following policy consideration: A child’s need for continuity requires the state to recognize
that a new family has been established the moment it has determined who shall be custodial parent(s). See
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 38 (1973). The new family
deserves, therefore, to be as free of state intervention as any other intact family. See id.
17. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
18. Id. At 69. The law at issue stated: “Any person may petition the court for visitation rights at any
time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings. The court may order visitation rights for any person
when visitation may serve the best interest of the child whether or not there has been any change of
circumstances.” WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (1994).
19. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 60-61.
22. Id. at 61.
23. Id. at 62.
24. Id. at 66. See also Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (“We have recognized on
numerous occasions that the relationship between parent and child is constitutionally protected.”); Parham
v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979) (“Our jurisprudence historically has reflected Western civilization
concepts of the family as a unit with broad parental authority over minor children.”); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (“[t]he fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and
management of their child”); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719 (1997) (“In a long line of cases,
we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms protected by the Bill of Rights, the ‘liberty’ specially
protected by the Due Process Clause includes the right[] . . . to direct the education and upbringing of one’s
children.” (citations omitted)).
25. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 68. The Court’s reliance on this presumption stems from Parham v. J.R. where
the Court explained:
[O]ur constitutional system long ago rejected any notion that a child is the mere creature of
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his or her children . . . , there will normally be no reason for the State to inject itself
into the private realm of the family to further question the ability of that parent to make
the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.”26 However, the
Court cautioned that the challenge to the statute in Troxel was as applied to the facts
of the case; hence, nonparent visitation statutes of the respective states were not
invalidated on a per se basis.27 The Court’s narrow holding and cautionary remarks
serve as a reminder that the individual states govern the world of family law, although
guided by the substantive due process rights afforded by the Constitution.
The parent-child doctrine enunciated by the Court has evolved over time as a
result of the Court’s ambiguity in defining a family (or parents for that matter) and as
a result of the Court changing with the needs and social mores of society. We must
look to the common law of the states to better understand the applied, functional
definitions and how they developed over time to the present day. When looking to the
states for guidance, the inherent difficulty is the disparity between states. However,
in examining the issue of adoption by same-sex couples, there is a national trend to
grant such adoptions.28 To better understand the importance of two (or more) legal
parents in the lives of children in the context of adoption by same-sex couples, it is
essential to comprehend how courts have addressed circumstances when parentage, and
likewise the definition of a family, is in question as is the case with parental rights of
third parties who lack a biological relationship to the child. This examination is
necessary because adoption is the creation of a legal parent-child relationship between
two individuals who lack a blood relation, the same creation enacted by courts in cases
of de facto parentage and guardianship. Accordingly, an exploration of relevant case
law of the states follows.

the State and, on the contrary, asserted that parents generally have the right, coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare [their children] for additional obligations. . . . The
law’s concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks
in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life’s difficult
decisions. More importantly, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection
lead parents to act in the best interests of their children.
Id. (quoting Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 602 (1979)) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
26. Id. at 68-69.
27. Id. at 73.
28. Statutory provisions in other states allowing an “individual,” “person,” or “resident” to petition to
adopt, have been interpreted to allow such persons to petition jointly. See, e.g., In the Matter of Infant Girl
W., 845 N.E.2d 229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006); Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); In re M.M.D. &
B.H.M., 662 A.2d 837 (D.C. App. 1995); In re Petition of K.M. & D.M., 653 N.E.2d 888 (Ill. App. Ct.
1995); Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995); Adoption
of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993). Furthermore, a number of states possess statutory authorization
permitting joint adoptions by unmarried persons. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 109.309(1) (West 2003)
(“Any person may petition . . . for leave to adopt another person . . . .”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.33.140 (West 2005) (“Any person who is legally competent . . . may be an adoptive parent.”). Similarly,
courts in other jurisdictions have allowed joint petitions for second parent adoptions by unmarried
individuals, like the instant case, to proceed on the ground that the biological parents do not relinquish their
parental rights. See, e.g., Sharon S. v. Super. Ct., 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003); In re Adoption of R.B.F. &
R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002); Matter of Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995); Adoption of B.L.V.B.,
628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
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B. Wisconsin’s Approach: A Bellwether Case Provides a Functional
De Facto Parent Definition
In 1995, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin decided In re Custody of H.S.H.-K.,29
holding that a court may grant visitation on the basis of a coparenting agreement
between a biological parent and another individual when visitation is in the best
interest of the child.30 In this oft-cited31 case, two women were in a committed
relationship for over ten years.32 The couple resided together and wore rings as
symbols of their commitment to each other.33 After deciding they wanted to raise a
child together, one of the women became pregnant through artificial insemination using
an anonymous donor.34 Both women attended childbirth classes together, both took
time off from work after the baby was born, and the two jointly chose a name for the
baby.35 Financial and child-care responsibilities were shared by the two women, and
collectively the three considered themselves to be a family with both women dedicating
themselves to meeting the needs of the child.36 When the child was approximately
four-and-a-half years old, the relationship between the two women ended, and
subsequently the biological mother and the child moved out of the shared residence.37

29. 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995).
30. Id. at 434.
31. See, e.g., In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 559-60 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that a former
domestic partner possessed standing as a psychological parent to petition for equal parenting time); In re
Hart, 806 A.2d 1179, 1187-88 (Del. Fam. Ct. 2001) (granting adoption to same-sex partner of an adoptive
parent on the ground that the stepparent had standing, the grant of the adoption would not alter the partner’s
parental rights pursuant to the original adoption, and the adoption was in the best interest of the children);
Janice M. v. Margaret K., 910 A.2d 1145, 1148 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2006) (concluding that a custody
dispute between a legal parent and a de facto parent is best resolved in the same manner as that between
two legal parents); S.F. v. M.D., 751 A.2d 9, 15 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (establishing that a de facto
parent is not required to prove unfitness of the biological parent or exceptional circumstances to be awarded
visitation); E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 893 n.11 (Mass. 1999) (determining that a former same-sex
partner was the child’s de facto parent and therefore the trial court possessed jurisdiction to award
visitation); V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 550-53 (N.J. 2000) (finding that biological mother’s former
same-sex partner was the children’s psychological parent and as such was entitled to visitation); Marquez
v. Caudill, 656 S.E.2d 737, 743-45 (S.C. 2008) (relying on the H.S.H.-K. four-prong test in reaching the
conclusion that stepfather was older child’s psychological parent); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912
A.2d 951, 972 (Vt. 2006) (holding that biological mother’s former same-sex partner was a parent of the
child); In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d 161, 166, 173-74 (Wash. 2005) (for discussion see Part II.F);
Susan Frelich Appleton, Presuming Women: Revisiting the Presumption of Legitimacy in the Same-Sex
Couples Era, 86 B.U. L. REV. 227, 272 n.269 (2006); Deborah L. Forman, Interstate Recognition of SameSex Parents in the Wake of Gay Marriage, Civil Unions, and Domestic Pastnerships, 46 B.C. L. REV. 1,
22 n.107, 30 n.149, 74 n.441, 75 n.445, 76 n.448 (2004); Melanie B. Jacobs, Micah Has One Mommy and
One Legal Stranger: Adjudicating Maternity for Nonbiological Lesbian Coparents, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 341,
354-58 nn.61-80 (2002); see generally William B. Turner, The Lesbian De Facto Parent Standard in
Holtzman v. Knott: Judicial Policy Innovation and Diffusion, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 135
(2007).
32. In re H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d at 421.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The child’s last name was a combination of the last names of the biological mother and her
partner. Id. at 422.
36. Id. at 422.
37. Id.
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Several months later, the biological mother informed her former partner that she was
terminating the relationship between the child and the nonbiological parent.38
Following this decision, the nonbiological parent filed a petition for custody and
visitation.39
The trial court dismissed the petition on the ground that Wisconsin law did not
recognize the relationship that existed between the nonbiological parent and the child.40
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a trial court has “equitable power
to hear a petition for visitation when it determines that the petitioner has a parent-like
relationship with the child and that a significant triggering event justifies state
intervention in the child’s relationship with a biological or adoptive parent.”41 After
meeting these two requirements the court may then consider the best interest of the
child in reaching a determination on the issue of visitation.42
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin declared the requirements of a “parent-like
relationship” when it provided that
the petitioner must prove four elements: (1) that the biological or adopted parents
consented to, and fostered, the petitioner’s formation and establishment of a parentlike relationship with the child; (2) that the petitioner and the child lived together in
the same household; (3) that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by
taking significant responsibility for the child’s care, education and development,
including contributing toward the child’s support, without expectation of financial
compensation; and (4) that the petitioner has been in a parental role for a length of
time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship
parental in nature.43

Moreover, the court established that for a “significant triggering event” to be present
the petitioner “must prove that [the biological or adoptive] parent has interfered
substantially with the petitioner’s parent-like relationship with the child, and that the
petitioner sought court ordered visitation within a reasonable time after the parent’s
interference.”44
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin’s decision in this case was instrumental because
it set forth specific requirements qualifying a nonbiological caregiver as a de facto
parent, thus taking a major step toward answering the question: “Who can be a
parent?” Furthermore, the procedural safeguards implemented by the court protect the
due process rights and autonomy of the biological parent by mandating that the parentlike relationship develop only with the permission and support of the biological
parent.45 Additionally, the court enunciated a mechanism by which “the best interest
of a child may override a parent’s right when a parent consents to and fosters another

38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 423. The decision of the Circuit Court (Dane County) denying a change in custody was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Wisconsin on appeal. Id. at 424.
41. Id. at 435.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 435-36 (footnote omitted).
44. Id. at 436.
45. Id.

328

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:1

person’s establishing a parent-like relationship with a child and then substantially
interferes with that relationship.”46
C. California’s Approach
In 2005, a California Court of Appeal decided Steven S. v. Deborah D.,47 which
upheld a statute48 providing that a sperm donor is not considered to be the natural
father of the child, regardless of whether an intimate relationship previously existed
between the donor and the mother. Steven S., although formerly in a sexual
relationship with Deborah D., donated his sperm for the purposes of impregnating
Deborah D.49 The court recognized that the State possessed a compelling interest in
establishing paternity for all children, yet ultimately concluded that a woman’s interest
to bear children by artificial insemination without fear of a paternity claim outweighed
the State’s interest.50 Likewise, the court determined that this policy also protected
men serving as donors to both married and unmarried women, eliminating liability for
child support or other claims.51
Nearly six months after Steven S. v. Deborah D., the Supreme Court of California
decided Elisa B. v. Superior Court,52 where it held that under the Uniform Parentage
Act (UPA), a child may have two female parents, and under such circumstances both
parents were financially responsible for the child.53 In this case, two women, Elisa and
Emily, entered into a romantic relationship in 1993 and began living together six
months later.54 The couple decided that they desired children and both wanted to give
birth.55 Both women chose a mutual donor through a sperm bank so that their children
would be “biological brothers and sisters.”56 Elisa became pregnant in February 1997
and Emily became pregnant in August 1997; subsequently the women attended medical
appointments and childbirth classes together as a couple.57 Elisa gave birth to Chance
in November 1997 and Emily gave birth to twins, Ry and Kaia (hereinafter, “the
twins”) prematurely in March 1998.58 Ry suffered from Down’s Syndrome, and

46. Id.
47. 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 2005).
48. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT (UPA), CAL. FAM. CODE § 7613(b) (West 2004) provides: “The donor of
semen provided to a licensed physician and surgeon for use in artificial insemination of a woman other than
the donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the natural father of a child thereby conceived.” Section
7613 is part of the UPA, adopted by California, which “provides a comprehensive scheme for judicial
determination of paternity, and was intended to rationalize procedure, to eliminate constitutional infirmities
in then existing state law, and to improve state systems of support enforcement.” Steven S., 25 Cal. Rptr.
3d at 484.
49. Steven S., 25 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 484.
50. Id. at 486.
51. Id.
52. 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
53. Id. at 662.
54. Id. at 663. The two women considered each other to be partners, and engaged in activities jointly
in order to symbolize the committed nature of their relationship. Id. Such conduct included the exchanging
of rings, opening a joint bank account, and Elisa obtaining a tattoo that translated to “Emily, for life.” Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
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additionally, he required heart surgery after birth.59 After the birth of the three
children, the women jointly selected the names, joined their last names by hyphenating
them to form the children’s last names, both breast-fed all of the children, and
identified themselves as coparents of Ry when seeking care for his Down’s
Syndrome.60 Emily did not work after the birth of the children, while Elisa financially
supported the household.61
The couple terminated their relationship in November 1999 and Elisa and Chance
moved out.62 Elisa initially paid the mortgage payments of approximately $1,500 per
month on the house where Emily and the twins resided, in addition to other expenses.63
Emily’s financial circumstances necessitated that she apply for aid.64 In November
2000, Emily and Elisa sold the house, and Emily and the twins moved into an
apartment. 65 Thereafter, Elisa paid Emily $1,000 per month until early 2001, when
Elisa lost her position as a full-time employee and told Emily she could no longer
provide financial support to Emily and the twins.66
In June 2001, the El Dorado County District Attorney filed a complaint in the
Superior Court to establish that Elisa was the parent of the twins and to compel Elisa
to pay Emily child support.67 Elisa responded by filing an answer in which she denied
parentage of the twins.68 A trial occurred in the Superior Court whereupon the court
established that Elisa was a de facto parent on the ground that “[l]egal parentage is not
determined exclusively by biology” and that “a person who uses reproductive
technology is accountable as a de facto legal parent for the support of that child.”69
Accordingly, the Superior Court ordered Elisa to pay $907.50 per child, totaling $1815
per month in child support.70 The Court of Appeal found in favor of Elisa, and directed
the Superior Court to vacate its order and dismiss the matter on the ground that Elisa
was not a parent of the twins under the UPA, and hence she possessed no obligation
to provide financial support.71 The Court of Appeal reasoned that a child could have
only one mother, and because Emily was the twins’ biological mother, Elisa had no
“legal maternal relationship” with the children.72
The Supreme Court of California granted review and looked to the UPA, adopted
by California and contained within the California Family Code, to discern both its plain
and implied meanings.73 The court began its analysis by noting the UPA’s indifference

59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 663-64.
Id. at 662-63 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 663.
Id. at 664 (emphasis added).
Id. Elisa was earning $95,000 per year at the time of trial. Id.
Id.
Id. at 665.
Id. at 664.
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to marital status,74 referencing the following provision: “A child born to parents who
are not married to each other has the same rights under the law as a child born to
parents who are married to each other.”75 Additionally, the court observed that
California’s recently enacted domestic partnership statutes76 permit two women to file
a “Declaration of Domestic Partnership,” which provides “[t]he rights and obligations
of registered domestic partners with respect to a child of either of them [to be] the
same as those of spouses.”77 Accordingly, the court could “perceive no reason why
both parents of a child cannot be women.”78
Once the court established that it was possible for the twins to have two female
parents, it undertook an analysis to determine whether Elisa was, in fact, a parent of the
twins in addition to Emily.79 In order to determine Elisa’s status, the court applied the
provisions of the UPA utilized to determine whether a father and child relationship
existed.80 Specifically, “a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child if ‘[h]e
receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.’”81
The court briefly addressed the first part of the test, stating that it was “undisputed”
that Elisa received the twins into her home.82 The focus of the inquiry then turned to

74. Id.
75. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 202 (amended 2002).
76. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297-299.6. (West 2004). Section 297, in relevant part, provides:
(a) Domestic partners are two adults who have chosen to share one another's lives in an
intimate and committed relationship of mutual caring.
(b) A domestic partnership shall be established in California when both persons file a
Declaration of Domestic Partnership with the Secretary of State pursuant to this
division, and, at the time of filing, all of the following requirements are met:
(1) Both persons have a common residence.
(2) Neither person is married to someone else or is a member of another domestic
partnership with someone else that has not been terminated, dissolved, or
adjudged a nullity.
(3) The two persons are not related by blood in a way that would prevent them from
being married to each other in this state.
(4) Both persons are at least 18 years of age.
(5) Either of the following:
(A) Both persons are members of the same sex . . . .
(6) Both persons are capable of consenting to the domestic partnership.
(c) “Have a common residence” means that both domestic partners share the same
residence. It is not necessary that the legal right to possess the common residence be
in both of their names. Two people have a common residence even if one or both have
additional residences. Domestic partners do not cease to have a common residence if
one leaves the common residence but intends to return.
CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2004).
77. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(d) (West 2004)).
78. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of California previously recognized that a child could have
two female parents when it upheld a second parent adoption where both parents were members of a lesbian
couple. See Sharon S. v. Superior Court, 73 P.3d 554 (Cal. 2003). In the present case, the court saw no
reason why the twins could not have two female parents if an adopted child could have two female parents.
Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666.
79. Elisa B., 117 P.3d at 666.
80. Id. at 667.
81. Id. (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (West 2004)). The court applied the rationale that the
basis for presumed fatherhood should equally apply to presumed motherhood. Id.
82. Id.
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whether Elisa openly held out the twins as her natural children.83 Citing the facts
mentioned above, the court concluded that Elisa held the twins out as her natural
children by assisting Emily in becoming pregnant and subsequently enjoying the rights,
and accepting the responsibilities, of parenting the twins.84 Thus, “[h]aving helped
cause the children to be born, and having raised them as her own, Elisa should not be
permitted to later abandon the twins simply because her relationship with Emily
dissolved.”85 Therefore, the court concluded that Elisa was the twins’ parent under the
UPA and as such she possessed an obligation to provide financial support.86
D. New Jersey’s Approach
In Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R.,87 a New Jersey appellate court held that
two children could be adopted by their biological mother’s partner and that the
adoption was in the children’s best interest.88 In that case, two women were committed
partners for a significant amount of time, resided together, and intended to have
children together.89 Through artificial insemination, one of the women became
pregnant and gave birth to twins.90 Both women actively cared for the children, made
parenting decisions jointly, and held themselves out as a family.91 The biological
mother supported the adoption by her partner, and a home study conducted on the
family recommended the adoption by the second parent.92
In support of the adoption, the New Jersey Superior Court (Appellate Division)
relied on In re Adoption of B.L.V.B.,93 where under similar facts, the Supreme Court
of Vermont reasoned that the statutory purpose of adoption is to “clarify and protect
the legal rights of the adopted person at the time the adoption is complete, not to
proscribe adoptions by certain combinations of individuals.”94 The Appellate Division
determined that granting a second parent adoption would not terminate the parental
rights of the biological parent, as that “would produce the unreasonable and irrational
result of defeating adoptions that are otherwise indisputably in the best interests of
children.”95 Furthermore, the circumstances presented “no doubt that the twins’ best
interest will be served by the adoption.”96
A New Jersey lower court resolved the issue of parentage of a newborn where two
females involved in a same-sex relationship proactively sought a determination prior

83. Id.
84. Id. at 669.
85. Id. at 670.
86. Id. at 662. In conclusion: “What is sauce for the gander is sauce for the goose.” Id. at 673
(Kennard, J., concurring).
87. 666 A.2d 535 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
88. Id. at 536.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 537.
92. Id.
93. 628 A.2d 1271 (Vt. 1993).
94. Id. at 1274.
95. Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d at 539 (quoting In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628
A.2d at 1274).
96. Id. at 541.
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to the child’s birth.97 The two women, Kimberly Robinson and Jeanne LoCicero,
began their romantic relationship in the fall of 2003 and subsequently became domestic
partners under New York law in December 2003.98 The couple decided to have a
child, and in mid-2004 Robinson became pregnant through means of alternative
insemination with the assistance of a physician.99 Robinson and LoCicero married in
August 2004 in Canada, and at the time the complaint was filed in March 2005 they
resided in New Jersey.100 On April 30, 2005, Robinson gave birth to a daughter.101 In
their complaint, the women sought a declaration of LoCicero’s parentage under New
Jersey’s Artificial Insemination Statute102 based upon their contention that the statute
should be read in a gender-neutral manner.103 Under a strict interpretation of the
statute, a married man and woman who conceive a child through artificial insemination
receive the benefit of a “presumption of paternity [that] attaches at birth.”104
The court began its analysis by noting that New Jersey adopted the UPA in 1982,
which supports the State’s interest in identifying parentage for the purpose of children
garnering support from two parents as opposed to the taxpayers.105 Additionally, the
amendments to the UPA in 2000 and 2002 fostered a more gender-neutral approach,
thus allowing the courts to “recognize the obligations of parents in any possible
combination and permutation of marriage of the parents, method for conception of the
child, and arrangements that intended parents make to have children.”106 Channeling
Justice O’Connor’s statement in Troxel rejecting the notion of a typical American
family,107 the court observed that “[t]he average American family (generally thought
to be mom, dad and two children) applies, in fact, to only 23.5% of the American
population, a decrease from 45% in 1960.”108 Accordingly, the court looked to
legislative guidance and common law precedent in reaching the determination that the
overriding concern must be the best interest of the child.109 Therefore, the court

97. In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d 1036 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2005).
98. Id. at 1037.
99. Id. at 1038. Alternative insemination is defined as a “simple procedure using a squirting device
(e.g. a syringe without a needle) to introduce semen into a woman’s vaginal canal for the purpose of
achieving pregnancy. . . . [T]he phrase is considered less offensive and more descriptive than the more
common phrase ‘artificial insemination.’” Id. at 1037 n.1 (quoting Family Pride Canada, Glossary,
http://www.uwo.ca/pridelib/family/glossary/ glossary1.html (last visited Sept. 19, 2008)).
100. Id. at 1037-38.
101. Id. at 1037.
102. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-44 (West 2002). The statute, in relevant part, provides: “If, under the
supervision of a licensed physician and with the consent of her husband, a wife is inseminated artificially
with semen donated by a man not her husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father
of a child thereby conceived.” Id. § 9:17-44(a).
103. In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d at 1037.
104. Id. “The husband is, by operation of law, the natural father of the child.” Id. (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 1039.
106. Id. at 1039-40.
107. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63 (noting the difficulties of defining “an average American family”).
108. In re Parentage of Robinson, 890 A.2d at 1040 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, PROFILE OF GENERAL
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, TABLE DP-1 (2000), available at http://censtats.census.gov/data/US/
01000.pdf).
109. Id. at 1040. The legislature established the “best interest of the child” analysis in section 9:2-4 of
the New Jersey Code, which was subsequently implemented in the aforementioned case of Adoption of Two
Children by H.N.R. Id.
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undertook the endeavor of applying the Artificial Insemination Statute to the
circumstances at hand, and established that “the individual seeking equal treatment
under the Artificial Insemination statute must show indicia of commitment to be a
spouse and to be a parent to the child.”110 With these elements satisfied, coupled with
the statutory requirement of assistance by medical personnel, the consideration of the
best interest of the child, and the State’s interest in establishing parentage, the court
was unable to identify a reason to decline interpreting the Artificial Insemination
Statute in a gender-neutral manner.111 Hence, the court presumed LoCicero to be the
parent of the child.112
E. Washington’s Approach
In a matter of first impression for the state, the Supreme Court of Washington
decided In re the Matter of the Parentage of L.B.,113 and held that a common law claim
of de facto parentage existed in the absence of statutory authorization when a former
lesbian partner sought shared parentage.114 In June 1989, Sue Ellen Carvin and Page
Britain began a romantic relationship and subsequently resided together from
September 1989 until February 2001.115 In 1994, the couple decided to conceive a
child together, and did so through means of artificial insemination with Britain carrying
the child.116 Together, the two women attended prenatal appointments, participated in
birthing classes, and signed notarized documents agreeing that they would be the
parents of the child.117 On May 10, 1995, Britain gave birth to L.B., a baby girl,118 and
the same-sex couple named her in accordance with their respective family names.119
Until L.B. was six years of age, the couple actively coparented her while living
together and holding themselves out as a family.120 During this time, Carvin and
Britain shared parenting rights and responsibilities; both women made decisions of a
medical, educational, and disciplinary nature.121 Additionally, L.B. referred to Carvin
as “mama” and Britain as “mommy.”122 In 2001, when L.B. was nearly six years old,
Britain and Carvin terminated their romantic relationship.123 In the spring of 2002,
Britain cut off all of Carvin’s contact with then seven-year-old L.B.124 Soon thereafter,
Carvin filed a petition in King County Superior Court to establish parentage.125

110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 1042.
Id.
Id.
122 P.3d 161 (2005).
Id. at 163.
Id. at 163-64.
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.
Id.
Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Upon reaching the Supreme Court of Washington, the primary issue became
whether the common law of the State recognized de facto parents, and if so, what rights
and responsibilities attached.126 The court looked to common law because the
“legislature has been conspicuously silent when it comes to the rights of children like
L.B., who are born into nontraditional families, including any interests they may have
in maintaining their relationships with the members of the family unit in which they are
raised.”127 Additionally, the court noted that although the “discussion necessarily
centers on the interests, rights, and responsibilities of the litigant adults, . . . ‘the best
interests of the child’ pervades our judicial consciousness in this field.”128
Accordingly, the court cited its “equity powers and common law responsibility to
respond to the needs of children and families in the face of changing realities”129 in
reaching its determination that “[r]eason and common sense support recognizing the
existence of de facto parents” and affording them the panoply of rights and responsibilities that attach to parents.130 Relying in part on “the persuasive reasoning of out-ofstate cases,” the court held that Carvin possessed standing to seek a declaration of de
facto parentage.131 One applicable out-of-state case was the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s In re Custody of H.S.H.-K. decision,132 from which the Supreme Court of
Washington adopted the four criteria for establishment of standing as a de facto
parent.133 Additionally, the court cited the Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s statement
in C.E.W. v. D.E.W.,134 where it recognized that a finding of de facto parentage is
“limited to those adults who have fully and completely undertaken a permanent,
unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life.”135 Consequently, with great importance, the court proclaimed that a de facto parent “stands in
legal parity with an otherwise legal parent, whether biological, adoptive, or otherwise.”136 The court, quoting the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, concluded that
recognition of an individual as a de facto parent “authorizes [a] court to consider an
award of parental rights and responsibilities . . . based on its determination of the best
interest of the child.”137 However, the court went one step further than its counterpart
in Maine, clearly articulating that a “de facto parent is not entitled to any parental
privileges, as a matter of right, but only as is determined to be in the best interest of the
child at the center of any such dispute.”138

126. Id. at 166.
127. Id. at 169 (footnote omitted).
128. Id. n.10.
129. Id. at 166.
130. Id. at 176.
131. Id.
132. See supra Part II.B for discussion.
133. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 176.
134. 2004 ME 43, 845 A.2d 1146. See infra Part II.F for discussion.
135. In re Parentage of L.B., 122 P.3d at 177 (quoting C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 14, 845 A.2d
1146, 1152).
136. Id. (footnote and citation omitted).
137. Id. (quoting C.E.W. v. D.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 15, 845 A.2d 1146, 1152).
138. Id. The court articulated that “[t]he appropriateness of the ‘best interests’ standard, even in the face
of unpredictable and evolving notions, is revealed by the fact that it unequivocally establishes the child as
the central focal point of the inquiry.” Id. n.26.
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F. Maine Addresses the Parent-Child Relationship
In 2001, in Stitham v. Henderson,139 the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as
the Law Court, noted the existence of a de facto parent, where a nonbiological parent
developed a significant parent-child relationship, and that this de facto parent
relationship may be recognized by the District Court in determining contact with the
nonbiological parent.140 John Henderson and his wife Norma,141 married in 1986, were
named on the birth certificate as the parents of K.M.H. when Norma gave birth to her
in 1993.142 Henderson believed that he was the biological father of the child, and
accordingly he developed and fostered a father-daughter relationship with her.143
Henderson and Norma divorced in 1996, and the divorce judgment granted shared
parental rights of K.M.H. to Henderson and Norma.144 Several months after the
divorce, Norma married David Stitham, and they participated in DNA testing to
determine whether Stitham was the biological father of the child.145 The test results
indicated that Stitham’s probability of paternity was 99.96%, and subsequent DNA
testing excluded Henderson as the biological father of K.M.H.146
Stitham filed suit against Henderson in the Superior Court, seeking a declaration
that Stitham was the biological father of the child.147 In response, Henderson filed a
counterclaim to establish his parental rights.148 The Superior Court declared that
Henderson was not the biological father of K.M.H. and that Stitham was the biological
father.149 Additionally, the judgment dismissed Henderson’s counterclaim as not ripe
for adjudication, 150 noting that the “District Court is the forum where sensitive family
matters should ordinarily be resolved.”151 Although the Law Court affirmed the
Superior Court’s decision that dismissed Henderson’s counterclaim,152 the Law Court
broke new ground for the State of Maine in its analysis of the family law issues
presented. The Stitham case presented a unique dilemma: Could the court recognize
that a child had more than two legal parents?

139. 2001 ME 52, 768 A.2d 598.
140. Id. ¶ 17, 768 A.2d at 603 (footnote omitted).
141. Norma took Henderson’s last name upon marrying him; later, she married Stitham and took his last
name. Id. ¶ 2 n.1, 768 A.2d at 599.
142. Id. ¶ 2, 768 A.2d at 599.
143. Id.
144. Id. ¶ 2, 768 A.2d at 599-600. In addition to shared parental rights, the divorce judgment, entered
in the District Court, awarded primary physical residence of the child to Norma, granted reasonable rights
of contact with the child to Henderson, and required Henderson to maintain health insurance for the child
and to pay Norma child support. Id. ¶ 2, 768 A.2d at 600.
145. Id. ¶ 3, 768 A.2d at 600.
146. Id. ¶ 3-4, 768 A.2d at 600.
147. Id. ¶ 4, 768 A.2d at 600.
148. Id. ¶ 5, 768 A.2d at 600.
149. Id.
150. Id. The Superior Court dismissed Henderson’s counterclaim without prejudice for the following
reasons: (1) Norma was not a party; (2) Stitham requested nothing other than a declaration of paternity; and
(3) Henderson’s post-divorce motion to enforce visitation was pending in the District Court. Id. ¶ 15, 768
A.2d at 603.
151. Id. ¶ 15 n.5, 768 A.2d at 603.
152. Id. ¶ 1, 768 A.2d at 599.
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For the first time, the Law Court recognized the existence of a de facto parent
when it provided: “The parent-child relationship [between Henderson and K.M.H.] . . .
places [Henderson] in the position of a de facto parent.”153 Furthermore, as a result of
his “prior legal relationship to the child and his current role as a de facto parent, the
District Court has jurisdiction to decide whether it is in the best interests of K.M.H. for
Henderson to have a continuing role in her life and what that role should be.”154 In a
separate concurring opinion, (now Chief) Justice Saufley recognized the evolution of
family law, which paralleled the advances in technology and genetics, allowing the
possibility for one man to be acknowledged as the legal father of a child through
marriage while another man is acknowledged as the biological father.155 Moreover,
Justice Saufley wrote:
Although DNA testing may provide a bright line for determining the biological
relationship between a man and a child, it does not and cannot define the human
relationship between father and child. When a man has been newly determined to be
the biological father of a child, the courts have a responsibility to assure that the child
does not, without cause, lose the relationship with the person who has previously
been acknowledged to be the father both in the law, through marriage, and in fact,
through the development of the parental relationship over time.156

Although Stitham established the existence of a de facto parent in the State of Maine,
it remained unclear exactly what functional role a de facto parent could fulfill in the
context of the definition of a parent as well as a family.
In re Guardianship of I.H.157 came before the Law Court in 2003 when a biological mother and her same-sex, domestic partner petitioned the Probate Court for coguardianship of one-year-old I.H.158 The couple159 was involved in a committed
relationship and decided to have a child shortly after they began residing together.160
I.H. was conceived through intrauterine insemination161 with sperm donated by an
anonymous individual in California through a sperm bank that assured its donors
confidentiality and obtained written waivers of claims to parental rights and

153. Id. ¶ 17, 768 A.2d at 603.
154. Id.
155. Id. ¶ 21, 768 A.2d at 604 (Saufley, J., concurring).
156. Id. ¶ 24, 768 A.2d at 605 (Saufley, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). See also Rideout v.
Riendeau, 2000 ME 198, ¶ 28, 761 A.2d 291, 302 (holding that the State has a “compelling interest in
providing a forum in which a grandparent, who has acted as a parent to the child . . . may seek continuing
contact with the child”).
157. 2003 ME 130, 834 A.2d 922.
158. Id. ¶ 3, 834 A.2d at 923.
159. The Law Court utilized the phrase “lesbian partners” in their description of the couple. Id. This
was the first notable occasion in which the court made an overt observation of the sexual orientation of the
couple through a term such as “lesbian.” Arguably, the inclusion of this word symbolized a paradigmatic
shift in the ideological perspective of not merely the Law Court and Maine, but those of other progressive
(or perhaps more aptly described as fair) states throughout the country, suggesting that a contemporary
shifting of norms in society was underway at the time. See supra notes 13 and 28.
160. In re Guardianship of I.H., 2003 ME 130, ¶ 3, 834 A.2d at 923.
161. “‘Intrauterine insemination’ is the current term for what used to be called ‘artificial insemination.’”
Id. ¶ 12 n.4, 834 A.2d at 925-26 (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 cmt. (2000), 9B U.L.A. 355 (2001)).
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responsibilities.162 Both women held themselves out as coparents and executed a
coparenting agreement, a domestic partnership agreement, and wills that designated
each other as the guardian of I.H. in the event that either died.163
Upon petitioning for co-guardianship, the issues of providing notice of the
proceedings to the sperm donor as father and the permissibility of co-guardianship
were raised, prompting the Probate Court to report questions surrounding both issues
to the Law Court.164 One complicating factor was the lack of clear statutory guidance
on the definition of the term “parent” as it applied to both questions; additionally, as
the Law Court observed, Maine has adopted neither the 1973 nor 2000 versions of the
UPA.165 The Law Court concluded that in circumstances where the biological father
is an anonymous sperm donor, the court may dispense with the requirement of service
on the donor because of the unlikelihood of notifying an anonymous sperm donor, and
the belief that anonymous sperm donors desire anonymity and thus forego any claim
to parenthood.166
Although the Law Court discharged the question of co-guardianship as a
procedural matter,167 the court provided guidance to the Probate Court in resolving
questions surrounding the appointment of co-guardians. In doing so, the court stated:
A Probate Court has the authority to grant limited guardianships and appoint a
guardian with specified and limited duties. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 5-105
(1998). In determining whether to grant a guardianship, a court decides what is in the
best interests of the child. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.18-A, § 5-204(b)-(c) (1998). This
must likewise be true when a court determines whether to grant a full or a limited
guardianship or coguardianship.168

Applying this reasoning, the Law Court alluded to the possibility that a limited
guardianship may provide a disposition wherein the biological mother retains all of her
parental rights.169 However, regardless of the Probate Court’s ultimate decision in this
matter, the Law Court reiterated the Probate Court’s responsibility to apply a best
interest analysis for the child in adjudicating the matter.170 Thus, this case took Stitham
to the next level, and stands for the proposition that a same-sex couple may
successfully petition the Probate Court for a determination (and in this case a creation)
of their legal standing as to parentage.

162. Id. ¶ 8, 834 A.2d at 924.
163. Id. ¶ 4, 834 A.2d at 924.
164. Id. ¶¶ 1-2, 834 A.2d at 923.
165. Id. ¶ 12 n.4, 834 A.2d at 925-26. The UPA provides, “A donor is not a parent of a child conceived
by means of assisted reproduction.” Id. (quoting UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 702 (2000), 9B U.L.A. 355
(2001)). “‘Assisted reproduction’ includes ‘intrauterine insemination.’” Id. (citing UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT
§ 102(4)(A) (2000), 9B U.L.A. 7 (Supp. 2003)); see supra note 161. Accordingly, same-sex couples benefit
from states adopting the UPA because they can seek permanent, legal parenting arrangements for their
children conceived through assisted reproduction without fear of an anonymous donor appearing out of
the blue and asserting their claim to parenthood.
166. In re Guardianship of I.H., 2003 ME 130, ¶ 16, 834 A.2d at 927.
167. Id. ¶ 17, 834 A.2d at 927.
168. Id. ¶ 19, 834 A.2d at 927.
169. Id. ¶ 20, 834 A.2d at 928.
170. Id.
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In 2004, the Law Court decided C.E.W. v. D.E.W.,171 where it expressly held that
a finding of de facto parenthood could result in the District Court’s award of parental
rights and responsibilities, based on the best interest of the child.172 C.E.W. and
D.E.W. were two women involved in a relationship who resided together.173 The
couple agreed that D.E.W. would conceive a child through intrauterine insemination,
and in anticipation of parenthood, both women changed their last names so that each
individual of their family, including their newborn, would all have the same last
name.174 Shortly after the child’s birth, both women entered into a parenting agreement
“detailing their intention to maintain equal parenting rights and responsibilities for the
child.”175 Approximately six years later, C.E.W. and D.E.W. ended their romantic
relationship when D.E.W. moved out and left the child with C.E.W. in the family’s
home.176 The parties entered into a second parenting agreement that again provided
for equal parenting and shared responsibilities, yet explicitly allocated expenses,
visitation, and contact.177 The court summarized the circumstances:
In accordance with their agreements, C.E.W. and D.E.W. have generally parented the
child as equals, sharing responsibility for the many decisions and personal sacrifices
expected of loving and involved parents. The child, now age nine, has bonded with
C.E.W. as his parent. The undisputed material facts suggest that the child is both
happy and healthy.178

Eighteen months after the end of their relationship, C.E.W. filed suit in the
Superior Court seeking (1) a declaration of her parental rights and responsibilities for
the child and (2) to equitably estop D.E.W. from denying C.E.W.’s parentage.179 The
Superior Court granted C.E.W.’s motion for summary judgment, which declared
C.E.W. eligible to be considered for an award of parental rights and responsibilities.180
In reaching this conclusion, the court accepted the parties’ stipulation that C.E.W. had
served as the child’s de facto parent for the entirety of the child’s life.181
On appeal, the Law Court noted, “When exercising its parens patriae power, the
court puts itself in the position of a ‘wise, affectionate, and careful parent’ and makes
determinations for the child’s welfare, focusing on ‘what is best for the interest of the
child’ and not on the needs or desires of the parents.”182 This approach, commonly
referred to as the “best interest of the child” standard, was codified in Maine in 1984

171. 2004 ME 43, 845 A.2d 1146.
172. Id. ¶ 15, 845 A.2d at 1152.
173. Id. ¶ 2, 845 A.2d at 1147.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. ¶ 3, 845 A.2d at 1147.
177. Id.
178. Id. ¶ 4, 845 A.2d at 1147.
179. Id. ¶ 5, 845 A.2d at 1147-48.
180. Id. ¶ 6, 845 A.2d at 1148. The court also granted summary judgment on the second claim,
concluding that D.E.W. was “equitably estopped from denying [C.E.W.’s] status as parent of [the child]
with all rights and responsibilities of any parent under the State of Maine.” Id. However, D.E.W. did not
appeal the summary judgment as to this claim. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. ¶ 10, 845 A.2d at 1149 (quoting Roussel v. State, 274 A.2d 909, 925-26 (Me. 1971) (footnote
omitted).
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and “stands as the cornerstone of the parens patriae doctrine.”183 Relying on the
motion court’s equitable jurisdiction, originating from the English Court of Chancery,
the Law Court justified the motion court’s judgment as an embodiment of its parens
patriae authority.184 Hence, the Law Court concluded that “when an individual’s status
as a de facto parent is not disputed and has been so determined by a court properly
exercising jurisdiction . . . , the court may consider an award of parental rights and

183. Id. ¶ 10, 845 A.2d at 1149-50 (footnote omitted). The “best interest of the child” standard,
currently codified in title 19-A, section 1653(3) of the Maine Revised Statutes, provides:
3. Best interest of child. The court, in making an award of parental rights and
responsibilities with respect to a child, shall apply the standard of the best interest of
the child. In making decisions regarding the child's residence and parent-child
contact, the court shall consider as primary the safety and well-being of the child. In
applying this standard, the court shall consider the following factors:
A. The age of the child;
B. The relationship of the child with the child's parents and any other persons who
may significantly affect the child's welfare;
C. The preference of the child, if old enough to express a meaningful preference;
D. The duration and adequacy of the child's current living arrangements and the
desirability of maintaining continuity;
E. The stability of any proposed living arrangements for the child;
F. The motivation of the parties involved and their capacities to give the child love,
affection and guidance;
G. The child's adjustment to the child's present home, school and community;
H. The capacity of each parent to allow and encourage frequent and continuing
contact between the child and the other parent, including physical access;
I.
The capacity of each parent to cooperate or to learn to cooperate in child care;
J.
Methods for assisting parental cooperation and resolving disputes and each
parent’s willingness to use those methods;
K. The effect on the child if one parent has sole authority over the child's
upbringing;
L. The existence of domestic abuse between the parents, in the past or currently,
and how that abuse affects:
(1) The child emotionally; and
(2) The safety of the child;
M. The existence of any history of child abuse by a parent;
N. All other factors having a reasonable bearing on the physical and psychological
well-being of the child;
O. A parent's prior willful misuse of the protection from abuse process in chapter
101 in order to gain tactical advantage in a proceeding involving the
determination of parental rights and responsibilities of a minor child . . . ;
P. If the child is under one year of age, whether the child is being breast-fed;
Q. The existence of a parent's conviction for a sex offense or a sexually violent
offense as those terms are defined in Title 34-A, section 11203; and
R. If there is a person residing with a parent, whether that person:
(1) Has been convicted of a crime under Title 17-A, chapter 11 or 12 or a
comparable crime in another jurisdiction;
(2) Has been adjudicated of a juvenile offense that, if the person had been an
adult at the time of the offense, would have been a violation of Title 17-A,
chapter 11 or 12; or
(3) Has been adjudicated in a proceeding, in which the person was a party,
under Title 22, chapter 1071 as having committed a sexual offense.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 1653(3) (1998 & Supp. 2007) (footnotes omitted).
184. C.E.W., 2004 ME 43, ¶ 11, 845 A.2d at 1151.
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responsibilities to that individual as a parent . . . based upon a determination of the
child’s best interest . . . .”185
The court recognized the importance of de facto parentage and underscored its
importance in the greater spectrum of parental rights and responsibilities when it
explained that the standard for determining de facto parenthood “implicates both the
fundamental liberty interests of natural and adoptive parents, and the protection of
those interests within title 19-A’s framework for awards of parental rights and
responsibilities to parents and third parties.”186 Subsequently, the court refused to
formally define the standard for judicial determination of de facto parenthood, leaving
this determination to the Maine Legislature or courts in the future.187 However, the
court noted that the ultimate definition of a de facto parenthood standard “must surely
be limited to those adults who have fully and completely undertaken a permanent,
unequivocal, committed, and responsible parental role in the child’s life.”188 The next

185. Id.
186. Id. ¶ 14, 845 A.2d at 1152.
187. Id.
188. Id. (footnote omitted). Although the Superior Court noted that the standard for de facto parenthood
outlined in section 2.03(1)(c) of the American Law Institute (ALI) Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution was applicable, the court declined to adopt the standard. Id. ¶ 14 n.13, 845 A.2d at 1152.
Accordingly, the Law Court also refused to adopt the ALI guidelines. Id. The ALI provides the following
definitions:
(1) Unless otherwise specified, a parent is either a legal parent, a parent by
estoppel, or a de facto parent.
(a) A legal parent is an individual who is defined as a parent under other state law.
(b) A parent by estoppel is an individual who, though not a legal parent,
(i) is obligated to pay child support under Chapter 3; or
(ii) lived with the child for at least two years and
(A) over that period had a reasonable, good-faith belief that he was the
child’s biological father, based on marriage to the mother or on the
actions or representations of the mother, and fully accepted parental
responsibilities consistent with that belief, and
(B) if some time thereafter that belief no longer existed, continued to
make reasonable, good-faith efforts to accept responsibilities as the
child’s father; or
(iii) lived with the child since the child’s birth, holding out and accepting full
and permanent responsibilities as parent, as part of a prior co-parenting
agreement with the child’s legal parent (or, if there are two legal parents,
both parents) to raise a child together each with full parental rights and
responsibilities, when the court finds that recognition of the individual as
a parent is in the child’s best interests; or
(iv) lived with the child for at least two years, holding out and accepting full
and permanent responsibilities as a parent, pursuant to an agreement with
the child’s parent (or, if there are two legal parents, both parents), when the
court finds that recognition of the individual as parent is in the child’s best
interests.
(c) A de facto parent is an individual other than a legal parent or a parent by
estoppel who, for a significant period of time not less than two years,
(i) lived with the child and,
(ii) for reasons primarily other than financial compensation, and with the
agreement of a legal parent to form a parent-child relationship, or as a
result of a complete failure or inability of any legal parent to perform
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step within Maine’s doctrine of parentage was taken when the court announced the
decision of Adoption of M.A. in August 2007.
III. THE ADOPTION OF M.A. DECISION
On August 30, 2007, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court,
held that title 18-A, section 9-301 (Maine’s Adoption Statute)189 permitted an
unmarried, same-sex couple to file joint petitions for adoption of foster children in
their care.190 In this case, two women, A.C. and M.K., filed jointly to adopt two foster
children, M.A. and R.A., whose biological parents’ parental rights were terminated by
the District Court through a child protective proceeding.191 Maine’s Department of
Health and Human Services placed M.A. and R.A. in the home of the same-sex couple
when M.A. was almost four years old and R.A. was four months old.192 After the
couple cared for the children for two years, a home study was conducted, which
recommended that A.C. and M.K. be allowed to jointly adopt the siblings.193
Subsequently, A.C. and M.K. filed joint adoption petitions for both children and the
Probate Court dismissed the petitions on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction
pursuant to the Adoption Statute.194 A.C. and M.K. appealed.195
The Law Court began its analysis by looking to the plain meaning of Maine’s
Adoption Statute. The statute states, in relevant part: “A husband and wife jointly or
an unmarried person, resident or nonresident of the State, may petition the Probate

caretaking functions,
(A) regularly performed a majority of the caretaking functions for the
child, or
(B) regularly performed a share of caretaking functions at least as great
as that of the parent with whom the child primarily lived.
PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 2.03(1) (2000).
189. Title 18-A, section 9-308(b) of the Maine Revised Statutes states:
In determining the best interests of the adoptee, the court shall consider and evaluate the
following factors to give the adoptee a permanent home at the earliest possible date:
(1) The love, affection and other emotional ties existing between the adoptee and the
adopting person or persons, the biological parent or biological parents or the putative
father;
(2) The capacity and disposition of the adopting person or persons, the biological parent
or biological parents or the putative father to educate and give the adoptee love,
affection and guidance and to meet the needs of the adoptee. An adoption may not be
delayed or denied because the adoptive parent and the child do not share the same
race, color or national origin; and
(3) The capacity and disposition of the adopting person or persons, the biological parent
or biological parents or the putative father to provide the adoptee with food, clothing
and other material needs, education, permanence and medical care or other remedial
care recognized and permitted in place of medical care under the laws of this State.
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-308(b) (2006).
190. Adoption of M.A., 2007 ME 123, ¶ 1, 930 A.2d 1088, 1090.
191. Id. ¶ 2, 930 A.2d at 1090.
192. Id.
193. Id. ¶ 3, 930 A.2d at 1090.
194. Id. ¶ 5, 930 A.2d at 1091.
195. Id.
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Court to adopt a person, regardless of age, and to change that person’s name.”196 The
court concluded that the statute was “reasonably susceptible of different constructions,”
and looked to its history and purpose for direction.197
In examining Maine’s legislative history regarding adoption, the court sought to
determine whether the Maine Legislature aimed to define “all possible categories of
persons leading to adoptions in the best interests of children.”198 The court concluded
that such could not be the case, as new issues periodically arise which fall within the
scope and policy of the statute.199 Furthermore, the court determined that the Adoption
Statute was not intended to prohibit unmarried persons from petitioning jointly for
adoption.200
The Law Court reasoned that “[a]doption statutes, as well as matters of procedure
leading up to adoption, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
purposes of the adoption institution and to protect the adopted child in the rights and
privileges coming to it as a result of the adoption.”201 Accordingly, the court
recognized the rights, responsibilities, and benefits of joint adoption to include: a
continued, certain relationship with an adoptive parent in the event of death of one of
the adoptive parents; the eligibility of the child for public and private benefits such as
Social Security, employment benefits, and intestate inheritance (among others); and the
love, affection, and guidance from two parents instead of one.202
Citing a “broader, systemic reason” for supporting a broad construction of the
Adoption Statute, the court cited the Probate Code’s requirement for probate courts to
analyze the best interest factors203 as a mechanism to provide permanence for the child
at the earliest possible date.204 Hence, the importance of permanency and stability
cannot be understated in the Probate Court’s exercise of discretion when evaluating the

196. Id. (quoting ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-301 (2006)).
197. Id. ¶ 16, 930 A.2d at 1093-94.
198. Id. ¶ 21, 930 A.2d at 1095 (quoting Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 319 (Mass. 1993)).
199. Id.
200. Id. ¶ 22, 930 A.2d at 1095.
201. Id. ¶ 24, 930 A.2d at 1096 (quoting In re Estate of Goodwin, 147 Me. 237, 244, 86 A.2d 88, 91
(1952)).
202. Id. ¶ 26, 930 A.2d at 1097. The importance of legal adoption by both parents of a same-sex couple
cannot be understated. Children should know that their relationships with both parents are legally stable.
Ellen C. Perrin, M.D., Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and Family Health, Technical Report:
Coparent or Second-Parent Adoption by Same-Sex Parents, 109 PEDIATRICS 341, 342 (2002). Furthermore, the two individuals who raise a child ought to have the security that comes along with legal
acknowledgment of parental rights and responsibilities. Id. The following six elements are achieved when
the law recognizes two legal parents (as opposed to one): (1) the second parent’s rights and responsibilities
are protected if the legal parent dies or becomes incapacitated—this prevents family members of the
deceased from successfully petitioning the court to parent the child despite the presence of a legally
unrecognized coparent; (2) the second parent’s rights are protected if the couple separates, and this would
allow the child to maintain relationships with both parents, particularly through visitation; (3) the
requirement of child support from both parents is established should the couple separate; (4) the child is
guaranteed eligibility of health benefits from both parents; (5) legal footing is provided upon which either
parent can provide permission for decisions of a medical, educational, health care, or custodial nature; and
(6) financial security for the child is established in the event of death of either parent by ensuring Social
Security benefits and other intestate entitlements. Id.
203. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-308(b) (2006); see supra note 189.
204. Adoption of M.A., 2007 ME 123, ¶ 28, 930 A.2d at 1097.

2009]

REALITY OF FAMILIES

343

best interests of a child.205 Moreover, by prioritizing the child welfare goals of Maine’s
Adoption Statute, the Law Court opted for implementing a construction of the statute
that “avoids a result adverse to the public interest.”206
IV. FROM THE SOCIAL SCIENCES FIELD TO THE COURTROOM
A. Same-Sex Parenting in a Heterosexual World
In Troxel, Justice O’Connor aptly stated, “The demographic changes of the past
century make it difficult to speak of an average American family. The composition of
families varies greatly from household to household.”207 It is not uncommon for
lesbians and gay men to be parents, as both individuals and couples. “In the 2000 U.S.
Census, 33% of female same-sex couple households and 22% of male same-sex couple
households reported at least one child under the age of 18 living in the home.”208
“[E]very relevant study to date shows that parental sexual orientationper se has no
measurable effect on the quality of parent-child relationships or on children's mental
health or social adjustment . . . .”209 Additionally, there are two potential advantages
for children with two lesbian mothers: “First, studies find the nonbiological lesbian comothers . . . to be more skilled at parenting and more involved with the children than
are stepfathers. Second, lesbian partners in the two-parent families studied enjoy a
greater level of synchronicity in parenting than do heterosexual partners.”210 Furthermore, gay fathers are no different than heterosexual fathers “in providing appropriate
recreation, encouraging autonomy, or dealing with general problems of parenting.”211
In fact, “gay fathers have been described to adhere to stricter disciplinary guidelines,
to place greater emphasis on guidance and development of cognitive skills, and to be
more involved in their children's activities.”212 Moreover, “there is no reason for
concern about the development of children living in the custody of gay fathers; on the
contrary, there is every reason to believe that gay fathers are as likely as heterosexual
fathers to provide home environments in which children grow and flourish.”213
Regarding the children of same-sex parents, “[r]esearch has shown that
adjustment, development, and psychological well-being of children is unrelated to
parental sexual orientation and that the children of lesbian and gay parents are as likely
as those of heterosexual parents to flourish.”214 Moreover, the American Academy of
Pediatrics concluded that “children who grow up with 1 or 2 gay and/or lesbian parents

205. Id. ¶ 28, 930 A.2d at 1097-98.
206. Id. ¶ 31, 930 A.2d at 1098 (quoting S. Portland Civil Serv. Comm’n v. City of S. Portland, 667
A.2d 599, 601 (Me. 1995)).
207. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63.
208. AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, RESOLUTION ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION, PARENTS, AND CHILDREN (2004)
available at http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbc/policy/parentschildren.pdf [hereinafter RESOLUTION].
209. Judith Stacey & Timothy Biblarz, (How) Does the Sexual Orientation of Parents Matter?, 66
AMER. SOC. REV. 159, 176 (2001).
210. Id. at 174.
211. Perrin, supra note 202.
212. Id.
213. Charlotte J. Patterson, Gay Fathers, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT, 397,
412 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 4th ed. 2004).
214. RESOLUTION, supra note 208.
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fare as well in emotional, cognitive, social, and sexual functioning as do children
whose parents are heterosexual.”215 Furthermore, children of same-sex couples are
remarkably free of pathological findings.216 Additionally, same-sex parents and their
children are similar to heterosexual parents and their children overall in terms of
characteristics, traits, and family functioning.217 Thus, “no research has shown that the
children raised by lesbians and gay men are less well adjusted than those reared within
heterosexual relationships.”218
Consequently the American Psychological Association (APA) concluded, “There
is no scientific evidence that parenting effectiveness is related to parental sexual
orientation: lesbian and gay parents are as likely as heterosexual parents to provide
supportive and healthy environments for their children.”219 This conclusion was the
basis for the APA’s resolution to resist discrimination against same-sex couples with
respect to both joint and second-parent adoptions.220 Ultimately, the APA announced
a powerful statement in their resolution, stating: “Discrimination against lesbian and
gay parents deprives their children of benefits, rights, and privileges enjoyed by
children of heterosexual married couples.”221
Traditionally, women have faced societal pressure to fulfill a heterosexual role of
marrying a man and having children.222 Along with the civil rights movement, the
1970s witnessed a gay liberation movement, which allowed gay and lesbian individuals
to publicly acknowledge their sexual orientations.223 This occasionally resulted in one
member of a heterosexual relationship “coming out” and identifying him or herself as
gay or lesbian.224 As a result, gay and lesbian parents have continued raising their
children either alone or with same-sex partners who fulfill a stepparent role.225 When
a stepparent seeks to adopt a child, and his or her partner is a biological parent, this is
referred to as a “second parent” adoption. This is contrasted by the classic adoptive
situation where neither member of the couple is a biological parent, and both
individuals seek full parental rights through the adoption process, typically through a
private adoption agency or through the public child welfare system.
Despite the increasing number of adoptions as well as the growing number of
adoptive parents needed, child welfare policies continue to reflect the traditional,
dominant “heterocentric” values of society as they relate to children, families, and the

215. Perrin, supra note 202, at 341.
216. SOCIAL WORK SPEAKS: NASW POLICY STATEMENTS 199 (4th ed. 1997).
217. Id.
218. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, POSITION STATEMENT: SUPPORT OF LEGAL RECOGNITION OF SAME-SEX
CIVIL MARRIAGE (2005), available at http://www.psych.org/edu/other_res/lib_archives/archives/200502.
pdf.
219. RESOLUTION, supra note 208 (citations omitted).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Henry M.W. Bos, Frank van Balen & Dymphna C. van den Boom, Experience of Parenthood,
Couple Relationship, Social Support, and Child-Rearing Goals in Planned Lesbian Mother Families, 45
J. CHILD PSYCHOL. AND PSYCHIATRY 755, 755 (2004).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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ongoing oppression of gay and lesbian individuals.226 “Heterocentrism is understood
as a result of heterosexual privilege or heterosexism and is analogous to racism,
sexism, and other ideologies of oppression.”227 Such sentiment, prevalent in the child
welfare field, serves as a tool to oppress gay men and lesbians from becoming
parents.228 Despite the movement of the 1970s, which resulted in a great deal of
“coming out” by gay men and lesbians, there are still large numbers of gay men and
lesbians who choose not to disclose their sexual orientation and this, accordingly,
contributes to the invisibility of this minority population.229 This invisibility leads to
the prevalent myths and misconceptions about gays and lesbians, including their ability
to effectively parent.230 The problem is cyclical in nature, as the myths and
misconceptions, coupled with hostility and discrimination, are major reasons why gay
men and lesbians choose to remain veiled.231 Affirming the equality of gay men and
lesbians as parents through cases decided on equal protection grounds would be a
significant step toward eviscerating society’s heterocentric stigma surrounding the
ability and appropriateness of gay men and lesbians raising children.
B. Implementing the Research
In light of this background, it is difficult to reconcile the actions of state legislatures and courts that refuse to grant same-sex adoptions on the implicit ground that
such parenting arrangements are inferior to those consisting of two heterosexual
parents. Of course, this idea of inferiority is rarely addressed directly by the legislatures or courts, and one is left to infer such a reason of inequality. Thinking procedurally affords us the opportunity to understand why courts rarely address arguments
under the Equal Protection Clause.232 Starting with the background knowledge that the
individual rights of homosexuals are a politically-charged issue, we can see why
political figures of all kinds are avoiding the issue. This ambiguity on the part of
politicians seems to reflect sizeable opinions by the general public on both sides of the
issue. Furthermore, courts are inclined to adhere to the following two principles: (1)
taking the easier way out when given the opportunity, and (2) saying no more than they
must in their opinions.233 Knowing the sensitive nature of the issue, coupled with the

226. GERALD P. MALLON, LET’S GET THIS STRAIGHT: A GAY- AND LESBIAN-AFFIRMING APPROACH TO
CHILD WELFARE 1 (1999).
227. Id. (citation omitted). “As in the larger social systems, heterocentrism informs much of the child
welfare practices and social policies concerning gays and lesbians. Heterosexual privilege underlies all of
the statutes, regulations, and case laws that govern child welfare programs in the United States.” Id. at 3.
228. Id. at 2 (citation omitted).
229. Id. (citation omitted). Hence, one reason why it is difficult to obtain an accurate estimate of the
number of same-sex couples parenting children, and how many of those couples would jointly adopt if
legally permitted.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
233. For example, in Adoption of M.A., the Law Court reached the conclusion that a same-sex couple
could file a joint petition to adopt two foster children in their care on the basis of statutory construction,
and not overtly on the basis that a same-sex couple possessed rights equal to those of a heterosexual couple.
See supra part III. Justice Levy, writing for a unanimous Court, focused on the statutory construction, its
procedural implications, and the benefits reaped by the child welfare system. Adoption of M.A., 2007 ME
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inclination of courts not to rock the boat if they need not do so, we can see why
petitioners’ briefs focus on statutory construction and due process arguments rather
than those based on equal protection. Consequently, as courts review and consider
arguments raised in petitioners’ briefs, it is no surprise that decisions are made on less
stringent grounds.234
To defeat undercurrents of inequality, the presumption of equality must extend
from the social sciences field to courtrooms across the country in a consistent manner.
For this to occur, the responsibility rests upon the shoulders of many throughout the
process. For example, more studies are needed to illustrate the benefits, and likewise
the lack of detriment, to children raised by same-sex parents. Additionally, such
studies should also look at families as a whole, focusing on the overall functioning of
the family as a single unit and ideally addressing the benefit to the parents and children
of possessing the legal permanence of adoption.
Armed with greater evidence-based ammunition, advocates in support of same-sex
adoption should advance this information in support of an equality argument, whether
the forum is a courtroom or a congressional committee. The message should be clear
that the social science research supports the ultimate premise that equality, due process,
and child welfare all mandate that adoptions by same-sex couples be considered in the
same manner as heterosexual married individuals.235 Accordingly, the equality demonstrated in the social sciences field should translate to a legal presumption that same-sex
couples be treated in the same manner as a heterosexual couples with respect to ability
to parent. This outcome is not only supported by empirical evidence, but is also
aligned with recent guidance from the Supreme Court with respect to equality as
discussed below.
C. Application of the Fourteenth Amendment
1. Romer v. Evans
In 1996, the Supreme Court decided Romer v. Evans,236 finding an anti-gay
Colorado constitutional provision237 invalid on the ground that the application of the

123, 930 A.2d 1088. In fact, the Law Court made scant reference to the fact that this was a same-sex
unmarried couple, and never once mentioned equality. Id. Regardless, the decision functionally achieves
the same outcome as if the Court had addressed the issue of equality, hence illustrating the desire,
functionality, and benefit of the adherence of courts to the idea that they will go no further than they must
in explaining their reasoning. However, one drawback of this practice is that it potentially leaves the door
open for future arguments based on a seemingly narrow holding.
234. See supra part II.
235. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. For the footing to be truly equal in the absence of
marriage, same-sex couples must be afforded the protections and benefits that a heterosexual marriage
would provide. For the purposes of this discussion, the most relevant and important benefit is a joint
adoption, vesting both individuals with equal parental rights and responsibilities.
236. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
237. The enactment, referred to as “Amendment 2” by the parties and state courts, originated in response
to ordinances in Denver, Aspen, and Boulder. Id. at 623-24. These municipal ordinances afforded
protection to persons discriminated against because of their sexual orientation. Id. at 624. Amendment 2
provided:
No Protected Status Based on Homosexual, Lesbian or Bisexual Orientation. Neither the
State of Colorado, through any of its branches or departments, nor any of its agencies,
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law must be neutral when the rights of individuals are in question.238 In Romer, the
amendment in question prohibited “all legislative, executive or judicial action at any
level of state or local government designed to protect . . . homosexual persons” from
discrimination.239 The Court concluded that Colorado’s amendment was too “[s]weeping and comprehensive,” and that it removed from gay and lesbian individuals, but no
other class, legal protection from discrimination.240 Additionally, its “sheer breadth is
so discontinuous with the reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the class it affects; it lacks a rational relationship to
legitimate state interests.”241 More simply stated, “The amendment imposes a special
disability . . . [in that h]omosexuals are forbidden the safeguards that others enjoy or
may seek without constraint.”242
The Court utilized the vehicle of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a means to invalidate Colorado’s Amendment 2.243 In undertaking a
traditional Fourteenth Amendment inquiry, the Court sought to find a relationship
between “the classification adopted and the object to be attained.”244 The Court
explained that the Constitution’s mandate of equal protection required a rational
relationship between the legislative action in question and the classification in order
to guarantee that classifications are not created to disadvantage groups of persons.245
The Court concluded that no rational relationship existed because Amendment 2
“identifie[d] persons by a single trait and then denie[d] them protection across the
board. The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to seek
specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our jurisprudence.”246 Justice
Kennedy, writing for the majority, articulated that “[c]entral both to the idea of the rule
of law and to our own Constitution’s guarantee of equal protection is the principle that
government and each of its parts remain open on impartial terms to all who seek its

political subdivisions, municipalities or school districts, shall enact, adopt or enforce any
statute, regulation, ordinance or policy whereby homosexual, lesbian or bisexual orientation,
conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis of or entitle any
person or class of persons to have or claim any minority status, quota preferences, protected
status or claim of discrimination. This Section of the Constitution shall be in all respects
self-executing.
Id. (quoting COLO. CONST. art. II, § 30b).
238. Id. at 623.
239. Id. at 624.
240. Id. at 627.
241. Id. at 632. “[I]f the constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it
must at the very least mean that a bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute
a legitimate governmental interest.” Id. at 634-35 (quoting Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534
(1973)).
242. Id. at 631.
243. Id. at 635.
244. Id. at 632 (observing that in a typical case “a law will be sustained if it can be said to advance a
legitimate government interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular
group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous”).
245. Id. at 633.
246. Id. The Court observed that there existed no legislation similar to Amendment 2, and cautioned
that “[d]iscriminations of an unusual character especially suggest careful consideration to determine
whether they are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.” Id. (citing Louisville Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37-38 (1928)).
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assistance.”247 Furthermore, “[a] law declaring that in general it shall be more difficult
for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself
a denial of equal protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”248
2. Lawrence v. Texas
Justice Kennedy again delivered the opinion of the Court in 2003 in the landmark
case of Lawrence v. Texas249 where two men in Houston were charged and convicted
for engaging in sexual intercourse with each other under a state law that criminalized
intimate sexual conduct between individuals of the same sex.250 The authoritative case
at the time was Bowers v. Harwick,251 decided seventeen years earlier, which sustained
a Georgia law that made it a criminal offense to engage in sodomy regardless of the sex
of the participants.252 Justice Kennedy, joined by four of his colleagues,253 analyzed
the circumstances broadly under the Fourteenth Amendment and not solely the Equal
Protection Clause,254 characterizing the issue as a deprivation of liberty.255 The Court
explained that the statutes possessed “more far-reaching consequences, touching upon
the most private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the
home.”256 Moreover, the statutes “seek to control a personal relationship that . . . is
within the liberty of persons to choose without being punished as criminals.”257
Furthermore, the Court noted, “When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate

247. Id.
248. Id.
249. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
250. Id. at 563. The statute provided, “A person commits an offense if he engages in deviate sexual
intercourse with another individual of the same sex.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.06(a) (2003). “Deviate
sexual intercourse” was defined as “(A) any contact between any part of the genitals of one person and the
mouth or anus of another person; or (B) the penetration of the genitals or the anus of another person with
an object.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 21.01(1) (2003).
251. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
252. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566.
253. Id. at 561. Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg joined Justice Kennedy in forming a
five-justice majority, while Justice O’Connor filed a concurring opinion. Id.
254. Id. at 574-75. Justice Kennedy explained his reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment as follows:
Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal Protection Clause some might question
whether a prohibition would be valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both
between same-sex and different-sex participants. Equality of treatment and the due process
right to demand respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are
linked in important respects, and a decision on the latter point advances both interests.
Id. at 575.
255. Id. at 562. The opinion begins:
Liberty protects the person from unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other
private places. In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the home. And there are other
spheres of our lives and existence, outside the home, where the State should not be a
dominant presence. Freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. Liberty presumes an
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and certain intimate
conduct. The instant case involves liberty of the person both in its spatial and in its more
transcendent dimensions.
Id.
256. Id. at 567.
257. Id.
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conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond
that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice.”258
The Court concluded that two post-Bowers cases, Romer v. Evans259 and Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,260 cast doubt upon the Court’s
willingness to follow Bowers pursuant to the doctrine of stare decisis.261 The Court
articulated that Casey, which upheld substantive due process rights of the Due Process
Clause, “confirmed that our laws and tradition afford constitutional protection to
personal decisions relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and education.”262 The Casey Court further provided:
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may make
in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to
define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the
mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.263

Building upon the reasoning of Casey, the Lawrence Court determined that
upholding the statute in question would deny homosexual persons the autonomy and
dignity afforded to heterosexual persons.264 Moreover, the Texas statute advanced no
legitimate State interest, and only served to demean a homosexual lifestyle.265 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the liberty afforded by the Fourteenth Amendment
gives gay and lesbian persons the right to determine, and act upon, their sexual conduct
without interference by the government.266 Therefore, the Court invalidated the Texas
statute and emphatically overruled Bowers,267 stating that “[i]ts continuance as
precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons.”268 In concluding the majority
opinion, the Court provided hope for future constitutional challenges by referring to
the concept of the “living” Constitution:269

258. Id. at 567.
259. See supra Part IV.C.1.
260. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
261. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573.
262. Id. at 573-74.
263. Id. at 574 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
264. Id.
265. Id. at 578.
266. Id.
267. Id. In announcing its holding the Court proclaimed, “Bowers was not correct when it was decided,
and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and
now is overruled.” Id.
268. Id. at 575. During oral argument Justice Breyer described Bowers as “harmful in consequence,
wrong in theory, and understating the constitutional value.” JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE
SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 188 (2007).
269. The concept of the “living” Constitution espouses shifting ideals of society in its interpretation of
constitutional rights. “[T]he principle of equality is not a static notion. It is rather a dynamic concept, a
moral imperative that constantly challenges us to question our assumptions about human potential.” Wilson
Huhn, Ohio Issue 1 is Unconstitutional, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 1, 11 (2005).
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Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth Amendment
or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its manifold
possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this
insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see
that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom.270

Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion shared the majority’s holding, yet she
relied solely on the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.271 The
Texas statute prohibited sexual intercourse only between individuals of the same sex;
hence, homosexuals were made “unequal in the eyes of the law.”272 In support of this
reasoning, Justice O’Connor repudiated the State’s argument that its moral disapproval
of homosexual sodomy constituted a legitimate interest to justify the statute’s
prohibition.273 Troubled by the statute’s reliance on moral disapproval, Justice
O’Connor firmly defended the Equal Protection Clause with the bright-line explanation
that the Court has “never held that moral disapproval, without any other asserted state
interest, is a sufficient rationale . . . to justify a law that discriminates among a group
of persons.”274
V. CONCLUSION
“Liberty finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”275 Same-sex couples
seeking to adopt live in a world of uncertainty and confusion, never exactly knowing
how legislatures, courts, and society will respond to their “nontraditional” paradigm
of “family.” Their freedoms surrounding familial relationships, child-rearing, and
procreation are trampled upon—yet these are the very sacred areas of a person’s
existence that the Fourteenth Amendment seeks to protect from unwarranted
government intrusion. However, we need not look to the federal judiciary or state
courts in order to reach that conclusion. The inequality is simply too clear.
Romer and Lawrence do not provide the solution, but they afford guidance as our
society moves further along the continuum of discovery of rights, personal freedoms,
and equality. Despite these holdings, which along with the various state decisions
discussed above are favorable to same-sex couples,276 the nation remains fragmented
in terms of a societal public policy. Whether one views this fragmentation in terms of
the varied opinions of laypersons, the inconsistent statutory provisions (or lack thereof)

270. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79.
271. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring). “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
‘is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike.’” Id. (quoting Cleburne
v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985)).
272. Id. at 581.
273. Id. at 582.
274. Id. (emphasis added). Moral disapproval, “like a bare desire to harm the group, is an interest that
is insufficient to satisfy rational review under the Equal Protection Clause.” Id.
275. Casey, 505 U.S. at 843.
276. But see Lofton v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Children & Family Serv., 358 F.3d 804, 827 (11th Cir. 2004)
(upholding the constitutionality of a Florida law prohibiting homosexuals from adopting children), cert.
denied, 543 U.S. 1081 (2005).
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of the states, or the creative judicial interpretation and reasoning in reaching the scores
of different outcomes, one thing is apparent—an unambiguous national standard is
necessary. Such a standard would reject the notion of forum-shopping, promote a
nationwide approach to child welfare, create more adoptive homes for children in need,
and enforce the constitutional ideals of equal protection, due process, and privacy.
Studies have proven that same-sex couples are equally as capable as heterosexual
couples with respect to parenting skills and family outcomes. Yet the opposite
presumption is still applied to the parenting of same-sex couples in many courtrooms
and legislative halls. This negative presumption ought to be eviscerated through an
approach advocating a blind eye to sexual orientation, coupled with an analysis under
the “best interest of the child” doctrine. This inquiry promotes the emotional needs of
the child, and allows the court to assess the parents in terms of their abilities and circumstances just as the court would when petitioned by a heterosexual couple. The
decisions of the state courts illustrated above show the many ways that same-sex
couples and the respective partners were deemed “parents,” “de facto parents,”
“guardians,” and even adoptive parents by the courts adjudicating their cases.
At the end of the day, courts need to decide cases. As such, judges possess the
ability to create functional definitions of families based on the circumstances presented
in each case. This is the ideal method by which the courts should determine parentage.
If there exists indicia that the couple is committed to each other and the child’s needs
would be met under the best interest of the child analysis, the family should be afforded
the legal protections and benefits that arise from the legally created bond of adoption.
This would truly meet the constitutional requirements of equal protection and due
process, thus allowing those in search of greater liberty to come forward in an attempt
to effectuate their own definition of parentage. Equality of this nature will breed, albeit
gradually, societal acceptance of same-sex couples taking on the role of adoptive
parents; eventually, the states’ moral disapproval of gays and lesbians will dissipate.
The failure to address adoption by same-sex couples in a constitutional manner leaves
children, families, and equality in a state of uncertainty—with all three entities being
among the most important protected by the Constitution. The time has come for the
states, and our nation, to repudiate inequality in the institution of adoption.

